Kinds of things and our choices. Ontology and presuppositons
Contemporary ontology tells us what exists, specifying the categories of objects that we should assume. I address some complications that arise when we try to build a philosophical reconstruction of the link between individuals and categories, with some examples mutuated from bio-medical research. These complications arise from the fact that given a domain of individuals, any classificatory principle determines a set of things. Therefore, there are many alternative ways of classifying things in classes according to their shared properties, producing different patterns of classification in categories guided by different theoretical assumptions. In fact, if we are not able to specify the strategy of the intended relevant properties and our preferences in advance, the empirical data themselves do not help us spot the perspicuous kinds. These theoretical assumptions can be considered the metaphysical background of any theory that assumes the notion of intrinsic property and pertinent and meaningful category.
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